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ABSTRACT
Survival of the Fittest: An Analysis of Network Television Show
Competition, 1978-1993
Justin W. Parker
During the first 60 years of television broadcasting, prime time programming was
dominated by the ”Big Three” networks–NBC, ABC, and CBS. Their dominance in
the market functioned as an oligopoly, supported by longstanding regulatory struc-
tures. Beginning in the 1970s, a wave of deregulation and change from satellite
technology swept the industry, making it easier for other firms to enter the market.
In 1986, the premiere of FOX saw a viable fourth network break through to compete
with the Big Three. This paper analyzes inefficiencies on both the cost and content
production side of prime time television, using survival analysis to study both the
practices of Big Three networks with respect to programming as well as potential
gaps in Big Three coverage which were exploitable by FOX to gain a foothold, find-
ing in particular that FOX’s observed practice of stacking comedies on Sundays took
place at the same time that Big Three networks were facing weakness on Sundays in
terms of show survival.
JEL Codes: Z10, K20, L82
Keywords: television economics, network television, survival analysis, regulation
ABSTRACT
Blackjack or Bust: The Effect of New, Local Casino Construction on
Housing Transaction Prices in Franklin County, OH
Justin W. Parker
In recent years, city governments across the U.S. have sought to address the prob-
lems of industrial decline and urban blight through initiatives designed to revitalize
local areas and fill the empty coffers of municipal and state governments. One popu-
lar option in this quest has been a push for the legalization of gambling coupled with
the construction of new casinos and other gambling facilities; of which the Hollywood
Casino in Franklin County, OH (opened in 2012) is a good example. This paper uses
several hedonic methods–including the standard hedonic model, a repeat-sales (RSR)
model, and a hybrid model in the manner of Case and Quigley (1991)–to explore the
effect of this new casino on property values. All methods find evidence of a negative
effect on housing values associated with proximity to the casino, implying that at
least with respect to individual plot values the addition of the casino is in fact a dis-
amenity to residents. The final component of this paper seeks to measure whether the
losses in property tax revenue associated with this decline in value meet or exceed the
revenue stream generated from casino activities; finding evidence in favor of property
tax tradeoffs in excess of casino revenues to the local government.
JEL Codes: H71, L83, R31
Key Words: casino, hedonic, real estate, property taxes, local government
ABSTRACT
Why Go Home? The Impact of Pearl Jam’s “Home Shows” on Hotel
Demand
Justin W. Parker
We use daily hotel data on price, occupancy, and revenue to analyze the economic
impact of Pearl Jam’s “Home Shows” in Seattle, WA. These two concerts were at-
tended by over 100,000 Pearl Jam fans, many from outside the state of Washington,
including international tourists. We find that the Home Shows generated approx-
imately 230,000 hotel nights before, during, and after the two concerts. With an
increase in the average daily room rate ranging from $12 six days prior to $144 on
concert days, hotel revenue in Seattle increased by over $58 million as a result of the
Home Shows. We estimate that increased demand from Pearl Jam fans led to an
increase in hotel tax revenue of between $6.69 million and $9.15 million. While the
‘Home Shows’ received no direct public subsidy, we argue that our results represent
a ‘best case’ scenario on the public revenue side of large cultural events that attract
tourists.
JEL Codes: I20, I23, L33, L38
Key Words: Pearl Jam, hotel nights, destination events,
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Chapter 1: Survival of the Fittest 1
Chapter 1
Survival of the Fittest: An
Analysis of Network Television
Show Competition, 1978-1993
I: Introduction
“When you’re young, you look at television and think, there’s a conspiracy. The net-
works have conspired to dumb us down. But when you get a little older, you realize
that’s not true. The networks are in business to give people exactly what they want.”
–Steve Jobs
Source: The Wall Street Journal
The above quote from legendary tech tycoon Steve Jobs rightly describes the network
television market as being driven by the same economic forces of supply and demand
as others. Jobs’ quote focuses on demand for certain types of television shows as the
driving force behind what television networks decide to put on air. Indeed, the entire
system of television show production, renewal, and cancellation can be viewed as a
dynamic process by which networks discover and respond to the desires of television
viewers. Given the lack of perfect a priori information regarding such preferences,
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this process is often chaotic: the vast majority of television shows are cancelled after
the first season. A handful of shows survive for a few more seasons, and a select
few television shows manage to last much longer; such shows (as for example CBS’s
Murphy Brown) can even shape national political and cultural discourse.
Television show survival depends on many factors, but perhaps the most important
is the system of television ratings produced by the Nielsen Company. Such ratings
are directly connected to the price of television advertising, which is in turn directly
connected to the total revenue taken in by a network. To elaborate, McNair (2017)
estimates that traditional TV advertising brought in $71.65 billion, or a third of total
media advertising spending, in 2017. Advertising dollars are fought over by both
the major networks as well as smaller channels, who negotiate higher ad buys based
upon viewership. The number of networks competing for said dollars is clearly an
important consideration, as are the various factors which determine the success of
particular television shows.
During the first 60 years of broadcast television, the market was dominated by
three networks–CBS, NBC, and ABC–known as the ”Big Three.” Their oligopical
dominance was dependent in large part on technological and regulatory factors which
remained static from the 1920s until the late 1970s and early 1980s. Another major
contributing factor were the creative partnerships between studios and networks which
served as a pipeline for major talent to be channeled into Big Three television shows.
A final factor was the difficulty presented by scheduling and genre; directly competing
with the Big Three involved running shows during prime days for television viewing
by audiences–the networks often stacked certain nights of the week with their best
television shows, with one prominent example being NBC’s Thursday night lineup
in the 1980s, in which they stacked popular shows like The Cosby Show,A Different
World, and Cheers back-to-back, with shows on other networks rarely rising to the
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level of direct competition.
This system would face threats on multiple fronts following a series of regulatory
and technological changes during the late 1970s. The first threat to arise was the
emergence of cable television, which offered an alternative to traditional broadcast
networks via satellite technology. However, the biggest change to primetime network
television would be the rise of the fourth network, FOX, in 1986.
This paper will seek firstly to provide an exposition into the evolution of the
technological and regulatory structure which allowed the Big Three to dominate,
as well as the changes which allowed FOX to enter the market and succeed where
others had failed, with a discussion of the relevant theory on oligopical industrial
organization. This will essentially cover the first two of three aforementioned reasons
for oligopoly in network television during the mid-20th century. The empirical second
portion will center on the third reason, and will attempt to analyze inefficiencies
present under the Big Three primetime television scheduling regime in order to gain
insight into how FOX found fertile soil to develop an audience.
1.1 The Development of Network Television, and
Television Show Production
This section seeks to describe the process of television show inception and production
in detail, looking at the historical development of network television as well as the
production process.
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1.1.1 The Rise and fall of ”the Big Three” Oligopoly
The story of television up until the 1970s was one of a few concentrated, original
content-producing networks. In the early years, the Big Three—NBC, ABC, and
CBS—competed against each other and the DuMont network. In 1956, DuMont
ceased operations due in large part to an inability to compete with the number of
stations boasted by other networks (Weinstein, 2006). This left U.S. media markets
with only three network providers of original content. Given the early role that the
Big Three played in the development of communications technology and infrastructure
across the country, they possessed vast market share which gained protection from
the government early on in the form of regulations.
Said regulations came about quite interestingly as a result of an effort on the
part of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to promote competition in
media markets. Due to the early technological edge elaborated on in the previous
section, NBC found itself with a large national network of television stations. Indeed,
some cities even had two NBC stations, such as New York, Chicago, and Washington,
D.C. (FCC Network Inquiry Special Staff, 1980). If the trajectory at the time had
continued, it was possible for NBC to form a monopoly over television communications
in much the same way AT&T formed a monopoly over telephone communications
(albeit the AT&T monopoly was specifically allowed for by government provision).
With this in mind, the FCC decided to limit the number of stations that individual
networks could operate in one city’s media market. These regulations, known as chain
broadcasting rules, helped to bring NBC to heel, and promote the rise of other extant
networks into fuller competition (FCC Network Inquiry Special Staff, 1980).
However, one must question the actual effects of the chain broadcasting regu-
lations. While it was now possible for the other, established networks to compete
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within individual media markets, it was next to impossible for a network to arise and
compete with the major players and all of their affiliates in said local media markets,
both nationally and individually, due to the economies of scale enjoyed by the large
networks. In order to form a company which could compete directly with the Big
Three, one would need a massive amount of capital to invest in a large number of
stations and infrastructure in different media markets, while also building a national
infrastructure to broadcast content. Only with these things, as well as a large pool of
creative talent, could a new network hope to compete with the existing advantages of
the networks. Thus, several barriers to entry existed which kept the Big Three firmly
ensconced as the sole providers of primetime television content well into the late 20th
century. For more information on economies of scale in network broadcasting, refer
to Litman (1979). Another issue with the FCC’s ruling was a lack of willingness to
actually enforce the rules against major networks in many cases, resulting in even fur-
ther challenges for smaller competitors relative to the Big Three (Anonymous, 1951).
Television would remain essentially unchanged until the 1970s.
While the chain broadcasting rules were important, another series of regulations
would help solidify a network oligopoly by the Big Three. In 1952, the FCC issued
the Sixth Order and Report (41 FCC 148, 1952). According to Thomas and Lit-
man (1991) this new policy effectively restricted the number of very high-frequency
(VHF), over the air commercial television stations receivable by markets across the
country. Specifically, the FCC limited the number of channels in each media market
to a quantity between one and nine depending on the size of the market; this, coupled
with requirements by the FCC regarding channel separation would effectively limit
the number of VHF receivable channels in the 100 largest media markets to three.
In theory, the commission allowed for competition over ultra-high frequency (UHF)
broadcast via conventional means at the time, but then-significant technological bar-
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riers prevented a viable competitor due to the lower quality of UHF broadcasts over
extant infrastructure.
The final pieces of the regulatory puzzle are the Financial Interest and Syndication
rules, which barred broadcasting companies from actually owning the content that
they produced. This meant that each network had to have an independently-owned
syndication provider to distribute original, prime time content. It also meant that
the ability of networks to profit off of the syndication licensing of their shows was
limited (Besen, 1986).
Several factors would converge to finally end the dominance of primetime televi-
sion by the Big Three. The first was related to the development of satellite technology.
During the 1950s and 1960s, a massive amount of public spending was directed to-
wards the advancement of space exploration technology. In 1962, the first American
satellite, Telstar, was placed into orbit (US Space Objects Registry, 2013). In the year
following this successful launch, the first geostationary orbital satellite was launched,
Syncom II. Geostationary satellite technology offered a chance to constantly beam
content from a single satellite across a certain geographic area by keeping pace with
the Earth’s rotation (Bray, 1965). This allowed for faster and better quality trans-
missions of content, and the national, terrestrial networks of the Big Three quickly
became obsolete. A window opened which provided a cheaper option to stream con-
tent versus these old systems. This change would give birth to cable and satellite
television during the 1970s, systems which challenged the old networks by introduc-
ing new channels with different content than that which was carried by the major
networks–this paper refers to Parsons (2008) regarding cable television history. In
1972, the FCC determined that the development of better satellite technology neces-
sitated a policy which opened up licensure for satellite operations to many firms—this
policy became known as the “Open Skies” rule (Federal Communications Commission,
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1972). Understandably, the removal of government licensure burdens from potential
operators allowed for the entry of new networks, bringing an injection of competition
into the television market. Upon an inspection of the content being produced at the
time—unconventional sports on ESPN, Christian programming on CBN—it is clear
that the new cable stations were not attempting to compete directly with the prime-
time products of the Big Three. However, certain programming such as news (CNN)
and movie broadcasts (HBO) were indeed challenged by early cable programming,
reducing the market share of Big Three networks (The Cable Center, 2015). Direct
competition with primetime programming on cable networks wouldn’t come until the
mid to late 1990s.
However, in the late 1980s with the launch of FOX by Rupert Murdoch, the CEO
of 20th Century Fox, a new competitor arose to challenge the status quo. Upon its
premiere in October of 1986, FOX appeared on 99 TV stations, reaching more than
80% of U.S. homes (Thomas & Litman, 1991). This number increased to 108 affiliates
in early 1987 (Anonymous, 1987), and 115 by the end of that year (Mahoney, 1987),
giving FOX an 86% reach. The question lingers: why did FOX succeed where many
other previous attempts had failed? The answer lies primarily with a change in regu-
latory structure which allowed FOX to take advantage of the same technology which
contributed to the rise of cable television. In 1980, the FCC undertook a thorough
study of network industrial organization, which led to several later policies intended
to increase competitiveness. The first was a 1980 decision which eliminated cable
distant signal importation rules, which made it even easier to stream content across
long distances, complementing the earlier “open skies” decision. The conjunction of
“open skies” with the new policy allowed for competition via UHF frequencies, as
the difference in quality was indiscernible over cable broadcasts. The second was the
1985 increase in multiple station ownership from 7 to 12 stations, a continuation of a
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then-ongoing breakdown in the chain broadcasting rules of 1941 (Thomas & Litman,
1991). Both of these developments allowed for an increase in UHF local stations,
which built a base upon which FOX could negotiate affiliate agreements. Finally,
FOX was able to take advantage of the regulatory environment at the time by pro-
gramming just under the number of hours required by the FCC to be considered a
network. This allowed FOX to skirt the aforementioned Financial Interest and Syn-
dication Rules, which in turn allowed for further network revenue from syndication
of original programming (Heldenfels, 1994).
Thus, FOX found fertile soil for a fourth network, and took full advantage of the
opportunity presented. A final important factor which influenced FOX’s rise aside
from the regulatory environment was the increase and shift in tastes and preferences
of demand for programming across households, and FOX’s unique position to provide
new, quality programming. Crandall (1974) makes the case for a fourth network
in part by arguing that demand for new programming would continue to increase
as Americans spent more and more time watching television, even on the weekends.
Indeed, by 1985 average television viewing hours per day had risen to an all-time high
of 7 hours and 10 minutes (Broadcasting Publications, 1987). These developments
undercut long-help beliefs in demand for television across the different day/genre
combinations, and contributed to an increase in demand for new programming that
FOX was all too happy to exploit. FOX would find its earliest success with The
Simpsons, a cartoon comedy featuring the eponymous family’s hijinks. Indeed, for
the years in this paper’s data, The Simpsons are the only FOX program to break into
the top 30 television shows, as rated by Nielsen. FOX was able to provide programs
such as The Simpsons and Beverly Hills, 90210 due to existing connections with 20th
Century Fox and other production companies. This allowed FOX access to pools of
highly sought-after creative talent, which increased the quality of their programs and
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attracted new viewers.
1.1.2 The Production Process for a Network Television
Series
To conclude this section, I will provide a brief explanation of how a network television
series is developed and put on the air:
Firstly, a writer has to produce a concept and pilot for a new series. This process
involves a large number of writers competing with one another for an extremely
limited number of new TV slots. The writer will then take his concept to a network
client-linked production house (in our sample, the clients are ABC, NBC, CBS and
FOX; each client has a production house linked to it), or to a major film studio such
as Universal, Paramount, or Disney. In the production of prime time television, these
production companies have the deepest pockets and the largest pool of talent and
collective industry “know-how” and relationships; thus, television shows produced
by said large companies have a clear advantage over those produced by so-called
independent studios, which are few and far in between. In order to get a show on
air, the concept, the story, the script, and the cast have to be approved by the studio
where the show will be filmed, the network on which it will be broadcast, and the
show’s production company. Most shows are brand-new concepts; a few shows are
spinoffs of existing series, and often have an easier time in the production process.
Once all of these boxes are checked, the production process will move on to shoot-
ing a pilot episode. Pilots are often two-hour long episodes meant to spur interest
in the show. If a pilot proves successful, the network will order a short series of 4-6
episodes. If it sees continued success, the network will order more; a full season is 22
episodes. Networks decide on day and time slots based upon an a priori estimation of
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how successful a show will be in said time slot given its various attributes alongside
the performance of previous similar television shows.
1.2 The Demand for Television Shows
Demand for television shows is based on a variety of determinants in much the same
way as other products depend on the same. In the previous section, an increase in
both the number of households as well as the average number of hours spent watching
television were discussed as factors increasing overall demand. In this section, I will
discuss the factors influencing consumer preference for one T.V. show versus another.
This section will be important for the empirical model to be discussed in following
sections.
An all-important consideration in determining consumer preferences for different
programs is based around the day of the week in question. Weekend prime time
generally starts earlier in the evening, at 7PM, because most people are home all day.
Hour-long T.V. dramas are generally scheduled for weekend and late-night slots as
well, which is understandable if one considers that people likely crave quick, simple,
entertaining programming immediately following the work day. Weekend shows also
tend to be less popular than weekday shows because more people are out of the
house during the weekends and Friday evening; one prominent exception would be
Sunday evenings, when most people are at home preparing for the coming work week.
Different days of the week tend to be more popular for T.V. shows as well; in this
paper’s sample, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday tend to boast most of the top
ten programs. Clearly, the days of the week as well as the different times of day that
programs air influence the demand for said programs, and networks place programs
in said time slots accordingly. This creates an endogeneity problem when considering
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demand for T.V. shows, as networks are actively placing shows in slots where they
receive maximum potential.
Another factor which could influence the demand for T.V. shows, and is dependent
on time-specific factors, is whether or not a show precedes or follows another popular
show. This is easy to understand—people could flip to a channel early to catch a
popular show, or fail to change the channel once said show has concluded. Again,
networks place shows before or after hits in order to maximize potential, creating
endogeneity issues when considering this factor.
Finally, content considerations are important to T.V. show demand as well. The
earlier discussion of T.V. show production companies is important, as they gener-
ally produce better-quality television shows based on available technology and acting
talent. While the names of each company have varied over the years, said major
production companies include, or have included: ABC Television, CBS Television,
NBC Television, TriStar Television, 20th Century FOX Television, Universal Televi-
sion, Columbia Television, Walt Disney Television, Touchstone Television, Paramount
Television, Warner Bros. Television, MGM Television, and Viacom Television. Genre
is also important under the content umbrella—sitcoms tend to be incredibly popular,
and the desire for entertainment over plot and substance was a noted development
during the years in this paper’s sample. (Smith, 1985). The presence of notable ac-
tors and actresses on screen can also influence demand for (and production of) T.V.
shows—Burt Reynolds, for instance, was able to leverage his fame on the silver screen
into a popular T.V. drama, Evening Shade.
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1.3 Theoretical Model
According to Varian (2009), three popular theoretical models exist to explain oligopi-
cal competition in the marketplace based around either quantity (Cournot) or price
(Bertrand) competition. This means that under each framework, companies seek to
set either quantity or prices in response to the actions of other companies. This sec-
tion can be thought of as an attempt to organize the narrative presented previously
into economic terms. The main source of revenue from prime time television comes
from advertising revenue. This can be considered the revenue per unit of television
consumed for network i ∈ [1, I] defined as αi, or more specifically in this case the unit
of revenue per each viewer via Nielsen ratings. Meanwhile, since television is largely
nonexcludable for prime time network programming, there is no price rationing mech-
anism in place. The ”prices” that firms choose to pass on to the consumer, the control
variable considered here, must be put in different terms. Costs borne by the consumer
include both the proportion of advertising time, which is assumed a universal disutil-
ity to consumers, and the cost in terms of a show being far off from their preferences.
The former will be considered first. The price of advertising per slot is clearly
endogenous to this model: the greater the demand for television shows D, the greater
the demand for advertising and thus the higher the price per slot. The proportion of
advertising per unit television consumption is also relevant to the price of advertis-
ing as well as television demand; this model will assume that demand is essentially
inelastic relative to advertising proportion over the range of values for the vector of
advertising proportions per show pi that networks are willing to consider, meaning
that ∂D
∂pi
= 0. Thus, advertising markets are taken as exogenous, and the price of
advertising αi is taken as a parameter, as well as the proportion of advertising pi.
As for the latter cost, define a vector θC which represents a set of television
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consumer preferences; values for this vector are greater than zero. A second vector,
θei , defines the expectations of network i ∈ [1, I] with respect to the beliefs and
preferences of consumers. These beliefs on the part of the network express themselves
in the qualities each show has, both those which cost money to produce (set quality,
etc.) as well as genre (ex. comedy). Taking this into account, consider
θei − θC = η, (1.1)
where η measures the difference between network beliefs about preferences and con-
sumer beliefs. A goal of any network is to minimize this value as much as possible
given the cost environment; ∂D
∂η
< 0. Networks are assumed to be profit-maximizing
agents who face the optimization problem
Max
η,pi
πi = R(η)− C(η) = αiD(θei )− C(θei ). (1.2)
Ultimately, revenue is dependent on demand, which is dependent on η and thus the
firm’s choice variable θei . Costs can be thought of as a function of θ
e
i primarily because
the network bears costs to produce the set of qualities present in a television show.
The above formulation offers unique insights into the market for network television
around the time that FOX entered the market. Firstly, while networks optimized η
to try and come as close to true beliefs as possible, ultimately there would always be
a margin of error. The main issue would be a systemic misestimation of consumer
preference which was recurrent across time. This is the kind of inefficiency FOX could
use to an advantage.
On a larger scale, this model is also helpful to link back to the discussion about
how the oligopoly was built in the first place. The cost function is key–nearly every
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single line item discussed in the earlier narrative had the effect of raising the minimum
costs of maintaining a competative network across the country. With the regulatory
hurdles overcome, and with the resources of 20th Century FOX to ensure a factory for
quality programming, FOX was well on its way to flattening the advantage enjoyed
by the Big Three networks in their cost structure. This allowed FOX to focus more
resources on finding underutilized times and genres in the primetime lineup of the
time.
1.4 Data and Empirical Approach
Alongside theoretical analysis of the effect that FOX’s entry had on Big Three view-
ership in the prior section, I will also analyze various factors that could influence
demand for Big Three programming, and thus a show’s survival, using a survival
analysis framework. This approach is inspired by De Vany (2008), which studies mo-
tion picture survival in theaters. It adds greater dimension to the data by testing
whether or not there is statistical evidence of covariate effects on survival. Much in
the same way, it gives deeper insight into timely market performance in prime time
television, highlighting under which genres and days of the week Big Three television
shows tended to struggle. Understanding this is key to understanding how FOX uti-
lized areas of inefficiency in programming to gain an audience foothold. I will assume
that network executives make decisions on television show cancellation and renewal
based upon current and expected viewership. Thus, television show survival depends
on the demand for each television show, which in turn depends on several factors such
as those discussed previously.
The data for this section of my empirical analysis comes from Brooks and Marsh
(1999), and includes all Fall primetime television shows which premiered on the Big
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Three networks as well as FOX from 1983 to 1993. The summary statistics are
reported as television show counts of each category under a specific network. The
proportions for each category as a portion of total network shows is also reported.
Two tables are reported for both day of week and genre: one for the first season, and
another for the second season. In this way, insight is gained into differences between
shows that survive the first season versus the total sample.
Table 1.1: Summary of Prime Time TV Shows in Season One by Day, 1983-1993
Day ABC Proportion CBS Proportion NBC Proportion FOX Proportion
Sunday 10 0.128 1 0.013 12 0.167 16 0.533
Monday 1 0.013 16 0.205 4 0.056 1 0.033
Tuesday 14 0.179 6 0.077 9 0.125 – –
Wednesday 15 0.192 22 0.282 8 0.111 – –
Thursday 9 0.115 9 0.115 5 0.069 6 0.200
Friday 14 0.179 12 0.154 16 0.222 4 0.133
Saturday 15 0.192 12 0.154 18 0.250 3 0.100
Total 78 78 72 30
Note: Proportion shows share of network total, or the count divided by the column total for the network.
Across all Big Three networks, the number of shows released in the first season,
and the number of shows which survive to the second season, is remarkably equal,
with NBC releasing slightly fewer new shows. FOX of course is far behind the Big
Three, with about half their numbers. This makes sense, given that FOX was only
extant for the latter half of the time period the data comes from, and only really
competed in prime time beginning in 1987.
Table 1.2: Summary of Prime Time TV Shows in Season One by Genre, 1983-1993
Genre ABC Proportion CBS Proportion NBC Proportion FOX Proportion
Action/Adventure 5 0.064 4 0.051 4 0.056 – –
Comedy 42 0.538 38 0.487 41 0.569 21 0.700
Documentary – – 2 0.026 – – 1 0.033
Drama 17 0.218 16 0.205 10 0.139 2 0.067
Legal/Police Drama 9 0.115 14 0.179 12 0.167 2 0.067
Other 3 0.038 – – 1 0.014 1 0.033
Science Fiction/Fantasy 1 0.013 2 0.026 4 0.056 2 0.067
Western 1 0.013 2 0.026 – – 1 0.033
Total 78 78 72 30
Note: Proportion shows share of network total, or the count divided by the column total for the network.
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Some days of the week seem to have been more popular for certain networks to
premiere new shows. In Table 1.1, ABC’s new shows are distributed relatively evenly
across all days of the week save for Monday. CBS is wary of Sundays and Tuesdays,
while favoring Monday and Wednesday. NBC tends to favor Friday and Saturday
relative to other days of the week for new show premieres. Finally, FOX made the
decision to only attempt to compete with other networks on certain days during the
early stages of the company. Thus, they have no shows which show on Tuesday or
Wednesday, and they are heavily favorable to competing on Sundays.
Table 1.3: Summary of Prime Time TV Shows in Season Two by Day, 1983-1993
Day ABC Proportion CBS Proportion NBC Proportion FOX Proportion
Sunday 3 0.125 1 0.045 2 0.083 4 0.571
Monday 3 0.125 6 0.273 2 0.083 – –
Tuesday 3 0.125 3 0.136 5 0.208 – –
Wednesday 6 0.250 4 0.182 1 0.042 – –
Thursday 2 0.083 2 0.091 5 0.208 1 0.143
Friday 4 0.167 3 0.136 2 0.083 – –
Saturday 3 0.125 3 0.136 7 0.292 2 0.286
Total 24 22 24 7
Note: Proportion shows share of network total, or the count divided by the column total for the network.
Meanwhile, the distribution of shows surviving to season two across days of the
week in their second season in Table 1.3 deserves mention. ABC is again relatively
evenly distributed, save for Thursday. CBS also has fewer shows on Thursday survive
to the second season; however NBC has a number of shows–primarily The Cosby
Show and A Different World–which lasted many seasons and were shown back to
back on Thursday evenings. Other strong days for NBC were Tuesday and Saturday,
while CBS tended to favor Monday heavily. Finally, FOX heavily favored Sunday for
second season renewal, alongside Saturday and Thursday.
Tables 1.2 and 1.4 are similar to the other summary tables, but different in that
they include the same information across several general bins for Genre. Many of them
are relatively straightforward. Documentaries include traditional documentaries as
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Table 1.4: Summary of Primetime TV Shows in Season Two by Genre, 1983-1993
Genre ABC Proportion CBS Proportion NBC Proportion FOX Proportion
Action/Adventure 2 0.083 10 0.455 – – – –
Comedy 15 0.625 2 0.091 13 0.542 6 0.857
Drama 2 0.083 4 0.182 3 0.125 1 0.143
Legal/Police Drama 4 0.167 4 0.182 7 0.292 – –
Science Fiction/Fantasy – – 1 0.045 1 0.042 – –
Western 1 0.042 1 0.045 – – – –
Total 24 22 24 7
Note: Proportion shows share of network total, or the count divided by the column total for the network.
well as docuseries and cop documentaries such as Rescue 911. Legal/Police Dramas
cover anything that is, put simply, of a non-comedic nature and related to law en-
forcement in the field as well as in the courtroom. ”Other,” finally, is a basket that
contains shows which have no place in any of the other categories. The count is quite
small, so this genre isn’t of particular focus to this analysis.
Comedies, which include sitcoms, are the dominant genre across all networks in
Table 1.2, making up about half of shows premiered in every case. Dramas and
Legal/Police Dramas rounded out the top three genres, with other categories making
up the rest. In Table 1.4, one can see that no shows from the category ”Other”
were ever renewed for a second season. Proportions in each network and across most
categories matched relatively closely with the proportion of shows premiered in Table
1.2.
One exception is worthy of note: FOX. Of all shows renewed by FOX, 86% of
them were comedies. Of the shows renewed, 57% of them were also on Sundays. The
intersect of the two is also, incidentally, 57%, meaning that 57% of shows renewed
for a second season were comedies on Sundays. Compared to similar statistics for
other networks, this likely represents a play for Sunday viewership through comedies.
Going back to our model of oligopoly in the previous section, this is an example of
FOX trying to gain a competitive foothold against the Big Three by offering different
programming on Sundays.Figures 1.1 and 1.2 provide insight into this; of all comedy
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Figure 1.1: Primetime Comedy Shows by Day of Week Aired in First Season,
1983-1993
shows premiered (Figure 1.1) and were renewed for a second season (Figure 1.2), FOX
takes a large position on Sundays.
In another manner of speaking, survival analysis allows us to study whether or not
certain covariates affect the hazard function for television show survival. A hazard
function can be thought of as the probability of failure at a specific point in time




where t is the observed time for subject j and Xj is a vector of covariates. The
function h0(t) is important with respect to assumed form; for this analysis I will
use two different methods of treating this function. The model chosen for use is the
Cox Proportional Hazards model, which was introduced by D. R. Cox (1972), and
is distinct from other conventional proportional hazards model in that it assumes no
parametric form for the function h0(t). In this respect, the paucity of assumptions
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Figure 1.2: Primetime Comedy Shows by Day of Week Aired in Second Season,
1983-1993
renders the Cox model preferable for this analysis. A primary assumption of propor-
tional hazards models is that the effect of the increase in the hazard is multiplicative
with a unit increase in the covariate. Two common options for survival analysis in-
clude both proportional hazards models as well as accelerated failure time models,
which assume that covariates increase or decrease the time in which a disease runs its
course. These models are also largely parametric in nature. Given the endogeneity
issues present in the model which make parametric estimation particularly suspect,
it is thus preferable to resort to a proportional hazards model. Another benefit of the
Cox Proportional Hazards Model is that it allows for consideration of covariates that
change over time as long as the data is formatted in long form, meaning that changes
are coded as a seperate observation at the time of the change.
Alongside the hazard function, another important component of the Cox model is
the survival function, graphs of which will be displayed for the various survival models
in the following section. A survival function can be thought of as the probability that
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time of death (or in this case. cancellation) is later than a certain point in time. All
of the above information on survival functions is taken from Kleinbaum and Klein
(2012), as well as Dobson and Barnett (2018), which also served as a reference for
the various forms of Equation 1.3.
Survival analysis for FOX might have proven interesting given availability of more
data during the period in question. FOX premiered substantially fewer shows during
the early years due to the targeted campaign undertaken to establish footholds on
specific days and under specific genres. Thus, only the Big Three are considered
during the period in question.
1.5 Empirical Results
1.5.1 Survival Analysis
The results of the survival analysis are listed in Table 1.5. Coefficients must be
interpreted in a different way from ordinary regressions. The sign of the coefficient
represents whether or not the hazard ratio is increased or decreased, representing
an increased or decreased risk of cancellation, respectively. The magnitude can be
interpreted as the scale by which each variable changes the hazard ratio. Models
of odd numbers in Table 1.5 represent survival analysis inclusive only of days of the
week. Even-numbered models represent estimations including covariates for both days
of week and genres. Friday is the baseline for days of the week, and Action/Adventure
is the baseline for genre, meaning that the results can be interpreted relative to those
days/this genre. It was difficult to choose an appropriate baseline, but the results
relevant to the discussion of FOX were not sensitive to choice of baseline.
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Table 1.5: Survival Analysis (Cox Proportional Hazards) Results
NBC ABC CBS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Sunday 0.489 0.170 0.022 0.152 -18.782 -18.301
(1.630) (1.185) (1.023) (1.165) (6.97E-09) (1.13E-08)
Monday -1.015 -1.302** 0.135 0.831 -1.547*** -1.696***
(0.363) (0.272) (1.144) (2.296) (0.213) (0.183)
Tuesday -0.920* -1.009* -0.122 -0.009 -0.670 0.053
(0.399) (0.365) (0.885) (0.991) (0.512) (1.054)
Wednesday -0.094 -0.223 0.109 0.137 -0.053 0.144
(0.911) (0.800) (1.115) (1.147) (0.948) (1.154)
Thursday -1.730*** -1.805*** 0.861* 1.005* -0.077 0.386
(0.177) (0.164) (2.366) (2.733) (0.926) (1.470)
Saturday -0.674* -0.909** 1.160*** 1.234** 0.531 0.724*
(0.510) (0.403) (3.188) (3.436) (1.700) (2.063)
Comedy -0.217 0.704 0.097
(0.805) (2.021) (1.102)












Sample Size 84 84 95 95 96 96
R2 0.240 0.294 0.151 0.221 0.358 0.440
*90% **95% ***99%
The main need for these results is to provide greater analysis into the insight
that FOX is taking advantage of a shortcoming by networks, primarily by going for
comedies on Sundays. A subsidiary goal is also to show areas of strength for the Big
Three networks–days and genres that show strength under the various networks.
NBC shows strength across all models on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays,
with significantly negative coefficients. Thursdays were strong for NBC due to The
Cosby Show and A Different World ; Tuesdays were strong due to Matlock and Law
& Order, and finally Saturdays were strong for The Golden Girls and Empty Nesters.
This shows a habit displayed by NBC more than any other network during the time
period: domination of certain days by stacking back-to-back, hit shows back to back.
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In the case of Thursdays and Saturdays, one of the hit shows was a spin-off of the
other. ABC shows strength on no particular day, but shows weakness on Thurs-
days and Saturdays. Finally, CBS shows significant strength across specifications on
Mondays. With respect to genre, ABC shows weakness with ”Other” and ”Science
Fiction/Fantasy.” Finally, CBS shows strength with respect to documentary series,
with the cop documentaries Rescue 911 and Top Cops surviving more than two
seasons. Overall, these observations confirm several that were made regarding the
summary statistics, and draws attention back to the reasons in each case. Alongside
this, there is a notable lack of evidence that Big Three networks have a positive as-
sociation between shows airing on Sundays and survival. This provides evidence to
confirm the hypothesis that there existed an opening for success for FOX on Sundays.
1.5.2 Analysis of Survival Curves
Analysis of the following Kaplan-Meier survival curves (see appendix) can assist to
study general behaviors of certain networks regarding survival and failure regardless
of day and genre. A curve is reported for each model listed in the regression table.
Each stepwise point in the curve represents moving forward one season; every show
has a 100% chance of survival then. In subsequent steps, the y-axis represents the
survival probability to a later season given survival to the current season.
Due to the further explanation for death with the addition of genre, the survival
curves for the even-numbered models have wider right-handed tails than their odd-
numbered counterparts, meaning that when you remove the effect accounted for by
genre in addition to day, your chances of survival increase. In the absence of any
covariates, the tail is even tinier; the results of this test are not reported but available
on demand. It might also provide insight into a common practice among networks:
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to shift shows onto less-popular days in later seasons as viewership declines. As day
is accounted for, survival odds increase in the base function during seasons two and
three, meaning that for those seasons in particular the effect of day of week has a
marked effect. Shifts in the curve due to the addition of day and genre in the further
right ends of the tails are relatively muted.
Between the different networks, one can interpret differences in curves as likelihood
to renew a show beyond each season in question. All major networks are similar on
the right end of the tail, but seasons two and three are of note. NBC shows the
least likelihood of survival past a third season, and shares similarities with ABC in
survival rates past a second season. Meanwhile, CBS appears highly likley to renew
past a second season during the time period in question, but appears similar to other
networks in reported survival rates for subsequent seasons.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper seeks to gain insights into the market for network television programming
during the time period 1983-1993, in order to analyze how FOX managed to break the
longstanding oligopoly of the Big Three primetime networks over content creation and
broadcasting in the United States. A long trend of regulation and then deregulation
helped to build and then subsequently undo the constraints which prevented a viable
fourth option from entering the market. In order to gain a foothold in programming,
FOX sought to compete on certain days using genres atypical from those used by the
Big Three. Analysis of network television data taken from Brooks and Marsh (1999)
using means including survival analysis provides useful insight into the structure
built up by the Big Three to optimize revenue and maintain market share during the
time period, while also providing a glimpse into certain days and genres which sat
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underutilized.
This analysis is particularly timely and relevant when considering the more recent
changes in the market. While overall content creation and streaming is entirely de-
centralized by the internet, many media companies are seeing massive mergers which
promise to continue the dynamic changes in media and entertainment over the course
of the past 40 years.
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Chapter 2
Blackjack or Bust: The Effect of
New, Local Casino Construction
on Housing Transaction Prices in
Franklin County, OH
2.1 Introduction
In the last two decades, there has been a growth in literature surrounding urban
amenities. Many papers have investigated extensively the amenity value of local
characteristics such as weather and climate change (Albouy, Graf, Kellogg, & Wolff,
2016; Bin, Kruse, & Landry, 2008; Maddison & Bigano, 2003; Meier & Rehdanz,
2017; Rehdanz & Maddison, 2009; Timmins, 2007). Still others have asked the same
question with regards to physical amenities of the cultural and historical variety (Bor-
goni, Michelangeli, & Pontarollo, 2018; Franco & Macdonald, 2018; Hicks & Queen,
2016; van Duijn & Rouwendal, 2013), alongside others focused on the amenity value of
places of worship (Brandt, Maennig, & Richter, 2014; Thompson, Butters, & Schmitz,
2012). Some authors, such as Fortin, Hill, and Huang (2014) even measure the value of
topics as novel as certain lucky and inauspicious numbers included in home addresses.
Finally, the literature has also focused on amenities most directly related to standard
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recreational and entertainment activities such as professional sports, restaurants, and
destination amenities such as ski lodges and forests. This literature intersects with
the recent focus on amenity construction in cities. In recent years, many cities in the
United States have solved the problem of decaying former industrial districts through
the construction of vast new development projects on said sites.
There are many reasons behind the consideration of such districts as a problem;
however the most common concern cited is crime related to synonymous ”urban
blight.” The current administration has spoken about the issue at great length, linking
decaying urban centers to crime and violence (Hains, 2016). The literature provides us
with a few explanations for the rise in crime as a result of this so-called urban blight.
Firstly, Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) propose that crime arises as a result of a
higher expected return from criminal activities versus legitimate ones. Framing this
from the perspective of urban blight, one can imagine that when legitimate activities
pack up and leave the expected return from seeking to engage in legitimate activities
plummets relative to the alternative.
A commonly-cited explanation for the effect of physical decay on crime is the so-
called ”broken windows” theory proposed by Wilson and Kelling (1982), which argues
that physical decay creates a mentality of social decay, which in turn inspires crime
that causes more physical decay, begetting a self-perpetuating cycle. The solution
proposed by the theory is aggressive policing of nuisance activities such as graffiti
painting, noise complaints, and indeed broken windows as a way of reducing physical
blight, and thus crime. While the latter theory is quite controversial, the proposed
solution is still highly influential in political circles especially given the current law
and order criminal justice approach by the federal government (Thusi, 2017).
The effect of crime on cities takes two glaring manifestations. The first is of
course the effect that crime has on quality of life not only for those directly effected
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by it but by those who live in fear of criminal actions being taken against their
person or property. It is in great part this latter effect which leads to the indirect
effect that crime plays: the fear of criminal activity serves as a disamenity, driving
down property values. Much of the literature supports this notion, with may papers
carrying providing empirical evidence. (Boggess, Greenbaum, & Tita, 2013; Ihlanfeldt
& Mayock, 2010; Pope, 2008). This could have a considerable effect on local tax
revenue, given that property taxation is the primary means by which municipalities
in the United States fund their activities. It is not entirely difficult to conclude that
this reduction in property values has had a hand to play in the budgetary issues
plaguing a variety of former industrial towns in the Midwest.
Efforts to improve the various issues associated with urban blight based upon
redevelopment of specific areas have come to be known as ”Targeted Area Redevelop-
ment” (Iams, 2006). A recent example of such targeted efforts to redevelop blighted
neighborhoods in a major American city can be seen with the Hudson Yards project
in New York. The land currently occupied by the new development was once a former
industrial district, full of vacated factory buildings and dockyards. The city, seeing an
opportunity to redevelop this area and bring in further revenue, allocated tax breaks
and other incentives to the tune of $6 billion for use in the project. Alongside higher-
end housing, the development includes various architectural and cultural amenities,
including a new $500 million city-sponsored arts center (Paybarah, 2019).
More pertinent to the subject of this paper, however, is the fairly recent rede-
velopment efforts in the city of Columbus, Ohio–the epicenter of Franklin County,
and a former industrial town heavily affected by the overall decline in manufacturing
seen in the last half-century. Two major projects come to bear heavily on this paper:
the Arena District project, and the Hollywood Casino. The Arena District project
bears many similarities to the Hudson Yards project: in response to a blighted, post-
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industrial downtown neighborhood, a motley group of investors, local governments,
and local businesses engaged in a multilateral effort to construct vast new amenities
in place of said blighted buildings. The project began with the construction of a
new arena for the Columbus Blue Jays NHL team, Nationwide Arena. Later phases
included the construction of new housing developments, shops, and other common
urban amenities. Tax incentives played a role here as well, with a public investment
of $35 million to improve roads and other infrastructure around the new district,
and for other development means. One of the main selling points regarding public
financing of the district was that the new commercial and residential activities would
lead to an influx of additional tax revenue; indeed, from 1998 to 2006, property
tax revenue from the redeveloped neighborhood increased from almost zero to $4.4
million a year (Iams, 2006). While research does not exist for indirect increases in
property values from redevelopment, inquiries such as that of Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte,
and Owens (2008) (in their case focused on the Richmond, VA property market) find
significant positive externalities on surrounding property values from localized urban
redevelopment programs.
It is within this torrent of new construction and attempts at additional revenue
generation that we find the origin of the Hollywood Casino, the central focus of this
paper. At its inception, the casino was intended to be a major part of the new de-
velopment in said project’s later phases. As with other casino projects, one of the
major justifications for new construction is additional tax revenue from the gambling
activities taking place within. For another recent example in nearby Illinois, Governor
J.B. Pritzker recently unveiled a plan to fund statewide improvement and redevelop-
ment projects based upon optimistic projections regarding a fairly recent expansion in
casino gambling (Munks & Petrella, 2019). However, while the casino was eventually
constructed in its current location within the western suburbs of Franklin County,
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an outcry from landlords and other stakeholders in the arena district quashed the
original placement plans (K. R. Cox, 2016).
This paper will use the case of the introduction of the Hollywood Casino in Colum-
bus to examine resultant issues related to property valuation and taxation. First, I
will explore the literature surrounding potential mechanisms by which casino place-
ment could feasibly affect housing prices. Secondly, I will summarize the data used,
examine the econometric literature surrounding standard hedonic and repeat-sales
models, and lay out the empirical model for the hedonic methods used in this pa-
per. Then, using property transfer data from the Franklin County Auditor’s office, I
will examine the post-hoc effect of the placement of the Hollywood Casino on prop-
erty values in Franklin County, OH using said standard hedonic method alongide a
repeat-sales model and finally a hybrid model in the style of Case and Quigley (1991).
Finally, I will examine the public finance implications of the casino placement, com-
paring realized average yearly local government revenues from 2013-2018 received by
Franklin County and her subsidiary municipal governments from the Ohio casino rev-
enue tax fund compared to the average yearly projected gains or losses in real estate
revenue from the expected change in property values in the surrounding area.
2.2 Literature Review
A good segue into perspectives regarding casino placement comes from the example
of the aforementioned resident outcry over the placement of a casino in the Stadium
District in Columbus. The question is thus: why might residents reject this proposal?
At face value, one might see many benefits to the local placement of a casino.
Firstly, the addition of new jobs might cause an increase in demand for local housing
through the addition of more workers as well as higher incomes. As well, Wiley and
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Walker (2011) find significant, positive effects on local commercial property values
from the placement of casinos, suggesting that casino placement is complementary to
increased economic activity in surrounding businesses. It must also be stated that
this paper is to the best of this author’s knowledge the only analysis on the impact of
casino placement on property values, commercial or residential. On the other hand,
Garrett (2004) studies the question of whether casino placement leads to significant
gains in local employment and income growth, and finds that positive effects are only
realized when placement occurs in rural counties, where any gains would likely make
up a large proportion of the county’s economic activity. The same cannot be said
for counties such as Franklin in Ohio, which are primarily urban/suburban commu-
nities in which casino activities would make up a substantially smaller proportion of
economic growth. Lim and Zhang (2016), studying the very same question as Gar-
rett (2004), find that growth in employment from casino placement dissipates when
controlling for economic growth in neighboring and statewide localities. It is thus
reasonable to conclude from the literature that price effects from employment and
wage growth due to the placement of a casino such as the one at the focus of this
paper, in an urbanized area, would likely have minor effects if any on surrounding
property values through this causal mechanism.
A second reason why casinos could provide a positive effect on local property
values comes from the indirect effect that additional tax revenue and associated im-
proved public amenities could have on property values. In Ohio, casino tax revenue
is distributed to local governments and school districts in statutory proportions of
the total revenue collected from casinos. Further details of this schema can be found
in later sections. From this observation and in conjunction with the literature, the
most obvious locally-provided public amenity most directly related to casino revenues
are public schools, which at face value should have a positive effect on local property
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values if school quality improves due to increased school budgets from casino rev-
enues. The issue of casino revenue disbursements will be discussed in greater detail
later in this paper, but the effect on schools must be considered. Ries and Somerville
(2010) explores the question of how school quality affects property values in detail
using district rezoning in Vancouver, finding that when accounting for long-run price
trends, the effects of increased school quality only affect housing purchased by high-
income families. This would suggest that improved school quality should not have
a significant effect on property values in the area given that the sample area in this
study is decidedly not high-income. Furthermore when considering an experimental
variable that takes into account distance from the casino, and knowing that school
funds are not distributed based on distance from the casino, this consideration should
not significantly affect the results of this paper.
A third consideration which might lead one to assume a positive effect on prop-
erty values from casino placement comes from the potential direct amenity effect
that casino placement might have due to the sudden addition of a new activity for
residents in the surrounding community. Casinos may also bring along new dining
and recreational activities which could serve to draw in more residents into the sur-
rounding communities. This is line with the work of Roback (1982), which proposes
that locations with significant positive amenities should experience a corresponding
positive rent gradient to compensate for the amenity value. To the best of this au-
thor’s knowledge, there exists no literature which attempts to test the direct amenity
value that casinos might have on local residential property values–the central goal of
this paper being to investigate the net effect of casino placement on property values
while exploring possible explanations for the observed effects. However, other feasibly
similar amenities such as sports arenas and sports teams have been investigated thor-
oughly. With respect to the amenity values of arenas themselves, Tu (2005), Ahlfeldt
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and Maennig (2009), and Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2009) are examples of papers which
have found a significant, positive effect on local housing prices from the placement
of arenas. Meanwhile, research from B. R. Humphreys and Nowak (2017) finds that
sports teams themselves generate significant negative effects on local property values
that depreciate with distance from the home arena.
The reason why said amenities are feasibly similar has to do with the potential net
effects that they could have on surrounding property values. In addition to the value
homeowners could gain (or lose) from having access to a local arena or sports team,
one can also imagine that the earlier positive effects from employment and increased
business activity could apply as well. Alongside this comes the consideration of
increases in crime from casinos as well. Here the focus is shifted quite clearly from
reasons why casino placement could cause positive effects on housing prices to reasons
why said placement could cause a decrease in housing prices. Crime is an obvious
disamenity for local residents, increasing the expected costs of living in a particular
area. Within the literature there exists a handful of papers dealing directly with the
effects of casino activities on crime. Chronologically, the first paper in this grouping is
Grinols, Mustard, and Dilley (2006), which explores the development of crime related
to casino gambling over time. The authors find that while the immediate effects of
casino activity on crime are modest, the effects increase with time. In the beginning,
casinos bring increased, localized wage growth and development–factors which could
potentially serve to decrease local crime rates. As an aside, this growth must also be
viewed in the context of this paper through the lens of the entire county versus the
local area–the effects on the county writ large might be small, but the neighborhood
effects could be proportionally far larger. Over time however, the effects seen from
increased payoffs to crime (ex. large amounts of winnings carried by lucky patrons) as
well as the development of problem gambling behaviors could lead to a time-delayed
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increase in local crime. Two subsequent papers relate to these results in different
ways. Reece (2010) finds that increased casino activity tends to reduce crime rates,
which would seem to refute the findings of the earlier paper. However, the evidence
presented is quite limited. Meanwhile, in direct response to the findings presented
by Reece (2010), Kim, Pang, Bao, and Bosworth (2016) addresses the same question
while tackling the issue of endogeneity between casino activities and the crime rate.
To explain, suppose increased casino activities create an increase in the crime rate.
Such an increase could feasibly then lower casino activities by driving away potential
patrons. Kim et al. (2016) tackles this problem via the use of a simultaneous equations
model, finding an increase in crime from casino activities that persists even after
adjusting for visitors.
The data available on crime rates directly related to casino activities in Franklin
County, OH is limited in that the Sheriff’s office to the best of this author’s knowledge
does not release localized crime statistics–the data on casino-specific and total crime
is only available at a county-wide level. However, we can see some small measure of
evidence that the data seen in Figure 2.1 (source: Ohio Casino Control Commission
and Ohio Department of Public Safety) seems to mirror the conclusions of Grinols et
al. (2006) and Kim et al. (2016): even as the county-wide crime rate declines overall
from 2013-2017, the casino-specific crime rate increases yearly by a substantial margin.
However, these crimes are only a small proportion of the total crime rate county-wide,
so how can it be said that they should have a significant effect on property values?
The answer could very well lie with the perception of crime in the localized area.
As has been previously stated, locals were already concerned with potential negative
impacts such as increased criminal activity prior to the casino’s opening. Any rapid
increase in crime after the fact, however small in proportion to the county-wide crime
totals, would serve to reinforce these prior beliefs. Indeed, an article from the local
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Figure 2.1: Total Crimes and Casino-Specific Crimes in Franklin County, OH 2013-
2017
paper appeared right after the opening of the casino headlined ”Crime Jumps around
Casino” (Manning, 2012). Thus, it is perhaps the perception of crime from casino
placement, rather than the actual felt effects of increased crime, which affects local
property values. Papers such as Raya, Montolio, and Buonanno (2012) explore the
effects of such perception, finding a significant effect on property values in Barcelona
from 2004 to 2006.
Overall, the literature suggests a complex picture of potential causal mechanisms
by which casino placement and activities might influence local property values and
thus property tax revenue. This paper’s major contribution is to provide the first
empirical insight into this question, in order to measure what the prevailing effect
might be: do the positive effects outweigh the negative, or vice-versa?
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2.3 Methods and Data
2.3.1 Franklin County, OH Real Estate Data
The Franklin County, OH Auditor’s Office provides a rich, publicly available data set
comprised of both transactions as well as assessed-value data for all commercial and
residential plots across the county from 1994-present. The empirical component of
this paper will use a subset of the full sample of transactions data taken from 2001-
present. This is done in order to achieve relative balance around the year of casino
placement (2012). I limit my sample to single-family homes on platted lots, which
comprise the vast majority of homes in the area and allows me to eliminate farm-
home plots in the sample, which would add unnecessary heterogeneity. Likewise, I
eliminate any homes not sold under General Warrant deed, which allows me to largely
focus on homes sold in normal transactions between parties lacking ties of kinship or
friendship. Homes bought and sold in the same year are excluded in order to control
for speculative land sales, or cases in which recent buyers were forced to sell due to
some unforeseen crisis. Finally, all cases which contained incomplete information for
at least one variable were dropped. In the case of the models with neighborhood fixed
effects versus those without, the difference in sample size can be attributed to a lack of
these neighborhood identifiers in the data. Upon examination of the documentation
accompanying the literature, these missing values do not have any methodical reason
behind their being missing, and thus it is assumed that omission of said information
is randomly distributed. Subsequently, the lowest and highest 1% of all transactions
with respect to sale value are dropped as well; this helps to exclude both extreme
outliers on the higher end as well as family-to-family and friend-to-friend transactions
on the lower end.
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Secondly, several variables were constructed from information available in the raw
data set. The variables for the presence of a basement and attic are dummy variables
taking a value of ”1” when as house is observed to have a full basement or fully
finished attic. The number of bathrooms present in the home is inclusive of both full
and half bathrooms. The presence of a garage is a dummy variable taking a value
of ”1” in the presence of at least one basement or above-ground, attached garage
space. Finally for values pulled only from the raw data, dummy variables (using the
R package ”dummies”) are created for every year in the sample in order to account for
yearly trends. Finally, the age of the home at the time of the transaction is generated
by subtracting the year the home was built from the sale year.
Figure 2.2: Location of Single Family Homes Transacted from 2001-2012 on Platted
Lots within 6 Miles of Hollywood Casino Columbus
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Using the ”geosphere” package in R, the distance of each parcel to the Hollywood
Casino site, measured in miles using the haversine formula for geospatial distance in
conjuntion with longitudinal and latidudinal information included in the dataset as
well as Google Maps (for the Hollywood Casino), is calculated. Another variable is
then constructed using this distance as well as an indicator dummy for every year
from 2012 onward. Further use of this information is used to limit the sample to all
homes transacted in the time period within six miles of the Hollywood Casino site;
many papers such as B. R. Humphreys and Nowak (2017) use similar distances as a
measure, in that particular case 5 miles. Given that the area around the Hollywood
Casino does not experience the same level of housing density, I expanded the distance
by a mile to capture a larger sample of transactions. The locations of said homes in
Franklin County relative to the casino are displayed in Figure 2.2. Finally, I construct
a series of indicator variables representing rings around the casino site, again in the
same manner as B. R. Humphreys and Nowak (2017) and others. Inspection of the
price gradients in Figure 2.3 (constructed in much the manner of Linden and Rockoff
(2008)) informs the ultimate decision to choose rings between 0 and 1.5 miles (”Ring
One”) as well as 1.5 to 3 miles (”Ring Two”). A variable representing a transaction
having taken place within the rings (rings x post-2012) will serve as the experimental
variable for each model in their own respective estimations, each estimation being
exclusive of the other. Again looking to the price gradients in Figure 2.3, we should
expect any positive or negative effects from the casino amenity to be increasing in
proximity to the casino site (B. Humphreys & Zhou, 2013). Also included for use in
certain model specifications are indicators at a neighborhood level, as measured by
the Franklin County Auditor. These neighborhoods most markedly do not contain
roughly equal numbers of homes; the range of homes within each neighborhood in
sample has a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 1,931.
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Within the amenities literature, two general methods have been used to calculate
the effect of an amenity on local property values. The first uses the distance between
the amenity and the property. This method, according to Ross, Farmer, and Lipscomb
(2009), is flawed in that it captures the effect of not only the amenity of interest but
also of any other amenities located at a similar distance from the parcel. This leads
to extreme sensitivity on the part of parameter estimates with respect to landmark
selection. Ross et al. (2009) suggests a method which uses longitude and latitude
to measure the precise location of each parcel, rather than the mere distance to an
amenity. This is near-identical to the process by which the ring variables used in this
paper are chosen.
Figure 2.3: Price Gradient, Combined Sample within 6 Miles of Hollywood Casino
The summary statistics are displayed in Table 2.1. Of the 28,120 total transactions
which take place within the 6-mile area during the time period in question, 12,003
involve properties being sold more than once. The average age at the time of sale,
37.12, is in line with other papers using single-family home data in a variety of
locations. The average sale price over the transaction period indicates a relatively
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Sale Price (in Thousands) 167.2 94.2 15 672
Plot Acres (GIS Calculated) 0.215 0.355 0.016 23.06
# of Bedrooms 3.141 0.603 0 7
# of Bathrooms 2.273 0.846 0 8
Floor Area (Sq. Ft.) 1552 538.198 320 6627
Age at Transaction 37.12 31.353 0 218
Distance from Casino 3.703 1.42 0.283 6
Categorical:
Has a Finished Basement 0.615 0.486 0 1
Has a Finished Attic 0.03 0.171 0 1
Has a Garage 0.652 0.476 0 1
Sale Year 2009 5.633 2001 2019
Distance from Casino < 1.5 Mile 0.069 0.254 0 1
Sample Sizes:
Transactions 28,120 – – –
Repeat Sales 12,003 – – –
lower-value set of homes; this is in line with the fact that communities present in
sample such as Westgate are considered to be good choices for first-time home buyers:
lower-cost, suburban neighborhoods.
One opportune fact about the area in which all of these transactions take place
is that there is a relative dearth of other amenities in the area which could serve to
confound the results. One of the main arguments made in favor of inviting the casino
into southwestern Franklin County was that it could potentially attract new busi-
nesses to an area lacking much in the way of commercial activity. This dearth began
with the twenty year decline and ultimate closure of the Westland Mall, which was
located right across from the future casino plot, in 2012. The mall was considered to
be ”dead” around the year 2003, when many anchor retailers began to close locations.
Given that this is the same year that the casino opened, it is hard to disentangle the
potential effects from both occurrences with 100% accuracy; however, later placebo
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tests carried out in Tables 2 and 3 using random distribution of the experimental
variable ”Ring 1 (2) x post-2012” show that said random placement variable does
not prove significant. In the case that the declining mall served as a disamenity, we
would most likely see the effect reflected in this variable across the period of decline.
Another local factor which contributes to the reliability of the results in this paper
is the general increase in property values during the post-2012 period across Franklin
County, as shown by the logged price difference index plotted in Figure 2.4. This is
owing to the fact that any negative effect on prices in the post-2012 period will be in
direct opposition to county-wide trends in property values during the same period.
Figure 2.4: Logged Price Differentials Index, 2001-Present
Certain geographical and other factors (ex. convenient access to shopping and
workplaces) could indeed serve to create problems for the standard hedonic estima-
tions through model misspecification. The primary benefit of including the RSR and
hybrid estimations in the results of this paper is that by design the procedure con-
trols for said factors. Thus, as a robustness check with respect to the same one can
examine the results of the RSR and hybrid models in comparison to the standard
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hedonic results.
2.3.2 Empirical Methods
The first component of the empirical results presented in this paper will largely follow
the empirical methodology used in B. R. Humphreys and Nowak (2017); that is, two
general kinds of models will be estimated: an initial standard hedonic model alongside
a repeat-sales model. The first type will be estimated using homes within the sample
which have only experienced one sale within the time period under examination. The
second hedonic estimation will be carried out with the full sample inclusive of both
homes sold once as well as homes sold multiple times. Each equation will be estimated
both with and without neighborhood-level fixed effects, and using the rings measure
as the variable of interest.
The basis for all of the empirical considerations in this paper is the standard
hedonic model originating in the work of Rosen (1974) and Nelson (1978). The
remainder of the empirical model (the specification equations as well as the ”mixed
model”) takes after the example of Jones (2010), itself a practical exposition of the
theoretical basis proposed by Case and Quigley (1991). Consider a sample of H houses
over times t ∈ [1, T ]. The sale price of each house h in the sample at time t, P th, can
be represented by









where Xth is a H x K matrix containing characteristics for each house being sold, d
t
h
is a T x H matrix containing fixed effects equal to 1 for the period in which the sale
takes place and 0 otherwise, νth is a 2 x H matrix containing the Ring 1 and Ring
2 Post-2012 variables. The coefficient Θ is representative of the time-independent
hedonic price of the variable of interest, and is thus the main focus of these empirical
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exercises. εth represents the error of the model at time t. The sample of H homes
can be decomposed into the following subsets: homes s ∈ [1, S] which only sold once
(the ”singles set”), and homes j ∈ [1, J ] which sold more than once. Of the latter,
we can further separate out the individual transactions of homes sold more than once
(the ”repeat set”) into earlier sales in time t and later sales in time τ . There is some
overlap between the two, as a second price in one sale could indeed be a first price
in a subsequent sale. Using this information, one can then construct the following
system of equations:






i + ηi + e
t
i, (2.1)






j + ηj + e
t
j, (2.2)






j + ηj + e
τ
j , (2.3)
Note that the error terms for these equations are decomposed from Equation 2.1 into
two parts: the time-independent specification error ηh and the white-noise error term
eth. Th specification error comes from the fact that we do not know the true functional
form of the hedonic function which transforms the characteristics and time dummies
into the observed transaction prices. Due to this limitation, I assume the function to
be linear, with an error term to absorb misspecification.
The formal RSR model can now be drawn out by subtracting the price at time τ
from the price at time t to yield
P τj − P tj = γδτj + Θnτj + eτj − etj, (3)
where δτj is a T x H matrix of dummy variables equal to 1 for the second sale year, -1
for the first sale year, and 0 otherwise–essentially the difference between the similar
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terms in Equations 2.1 and 2.2. Likewise, nτj is a similarly-constructed variable for
the νtj variables in the earlier system of equations, equal to 1 for each property set
where time t < 2012 and time τ ≥ 2012; and zero otherwise.
The volatility present in Figure 2.4 creates cause for concern as to the suitability
of an RSR specification as a good substitute for the hedonic price function, as such
volatility can indicate that the sample of re-sold homes possess different characteristics
than the sample of single-transaction homes. Furthermore, there thus exists a concern
as to the relative stability of our hedonic prices for each characteristic in Xth across
the sample time period. To test whether or not the hedonic function is indeed stable
in this respect I estimate a mixed model to analyze the amount of time variation in
the price function of log square footage (the elasticity of dwelling size) of homes across
the entirety of Franklin County during the period in question following the example
of B. R. Humphreys and Nowak (2017). This model can be expressed as
pnct = αc + δt + γt logSqftnct + εnct, (4)
where the neighborhood-level fixed effects αc and the hedonic price of logged housing
size γt are treated as random variables drawn from a normal distribution. Upon
inspection of Table 2.2 (results produced using the ”lme4” package in R), one can
see that the variance of the time-dependent hedonic prices for the size of the home,
E(γ2c ), is far smaller than the variance of the time-independent neighborhood-level
fixed effects, which suggests relative stability across the time period in question.
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Table 2.2: Mixed Model Results
Model 1 Model 2
Distance 0.006* –
(0.002)
Distance x Post 0.009* –
(0.001)
Ring 1 – -0.004
(0.016)
Ring 2 – 0.019
(0.012)
Ring 1 x Post – -0.021
(0.024)
Ring 2 x Post – -0.040*
(0.019)
E(α2t ) 2.949 2.964




Note: Ring 1 is between 0 and 1.5 miles, and Ring 2 is between 1.5 and 3 miles.
Even still, another concern with the estimation of both models separately is that
each is incredibly wasteful of the information present in the data of the other. Given
this, I return now to the earlier Equations 2.1, 2.2, and 3. These equations comprise
a system of equations which form the backbone of the aforementioned hybrid model.
The amount of data we omit to form a model with minimum sample heterogeneity
is minimized in this hybrid model, as the transformation renders an OLS model
estimated using the data transformed via the following process robust to sample
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e , per the error assumptions
and hereafter known as Identity 1. Recall that εth is simply equal to the error term
present in the undecomposed hedonic model run using both repeat as well as single
sales. Continuing the discussion of errors in the model, it can be shown that if the
model specification error ηh is equal to zero, or rather no misspecifications are made
in the original hedonic equation, the hybrid model is equivalent to the hedonic model.
Since this is not the case–every hedonic model introduces some measure of error–this
model is an improvement in the estimation of hedonic prices.
Since it was assumed that the misspecification errors of the hedonic models were
unrelated to the included variables themselves, Jones (2010) makes clear connections
between the hybrid model and a random effects model. From this insight, the follow-
ing strategy for a consistent estimate of Ω is developed. It involves firstly estimating
a RSR model of the set of all repeat sales n ∈ [1, NRS] to obtain the residuals ζ̂n.
Note that the number NRS is distinct from J , the reason being that this number
indexes the transaction, and not the home itself–some homes are sold more than once
in the sample. Then, using these values to calculate the sum of squared residuals, one













The above estimation of σ̂2e can be shown to be consistent. Meanwhile, taking the
residuals from the estimation of the combined hedonic model, one can find that
σ̂2ε =
( 1
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Having obtained these values, the covariance matrix Ω can then be formed.
The next step is to obtain matrix P, which can be calculated via the Cholesky
decomposition of the matrix Ω−1, so that P′P = Ω−1. Matrix P can then be used
to re-weight the data used, the rows of which are layered in the matrix X in the
following manner: single transactions first, then first transactions in the repeat sales
model (both inclusive of all variables in the hedonic models), and finally the RSR
data–much in the same manner as Equations 2.1,2.2, and 2.3. Following this, the
hybrid model can then be estimated via OLS in the same manner as the hedonic




To begin, I report the results for all of the basic hedonic regressions in Tables 2.4
and 2.3. Table 2.4 reports the results using all available data in the sample. Model
1 attempts to measure the hedonic price of the Rings x Post-2012 variable, while
Model 2 is structured towards the same goal while controlling for the effects of the
specific neighborhood in the vicinity of the casino. Models 3 & 4 mirror Models 1 &
2 except that in place of the observed experimental variables, I have generated new
variables of the same construct which are randomly placed across the entire sample
regardless of pre or post 2012 status as a placebo test. The effect reported for said
variables is analogous to the variable Θ in Equation 2.1. Table 2.3 reports the results
of the same specifications as described above, this time using the single transactions
data. All dependent variables, whether for price in the case of the standard hedonic
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models or the price differential in the case of repeat sales models, are logged; this has
the implication of making the coefficients for the ring variables analogous to percent
changes in prices.
Table 2.3: Hedonic Results–Single Transaction Sample
Treatment Models Placebo Models
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Ring 1 -0.168*** 0.069*** -0.241*** -0.013
(0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017)
Ring 2 -0.209*** 0.084*** -0.277*** 0.014
(0.008) (0.0019) (0.009) (0.011)
Ring 1 x Post -0.186*** -0.196*** -0.007 -0.006
(0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017)
Ring 2 x Post -0.179*** -0.191*** -0.003 -0.006
(0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008)
Neighborhood Fixed Effects 7 X 7 X
Observations 16,117 15,824 16,117 15,824
R2 0.486 0.780 0.480 0.774
*95% **99% ***99.9%
Note: Ring 1 is between 0 and 1.5 miles, and Ring 2 is between 1.5 and 3 miles.
Upon inspection of both tables, one can clearly see robust results across all specifi-
cations in favor of the hypothesis that the casino generated negative a price differential
equivalent to between minus 17-20% for the ring variables. This effect was implied
in Figure 2.3, and the results here indeed confirm that observation–the ring variables
have negative coefficients, indicating that being within the prescribed rings likely cre-
ates a negative effect on house prices. The magnitude of these effects is remarkably
consistent across the different samples, with similar numbers reported for equivalent
models using the single and combined samples.
A question arises of whether or not the area immediately around the casino always
generated a negative effect on housing prices within the 6-mile radius of the sample,
and if so whether this is feeding into the ”Ring x Post” variables. To test this, I
constructed the aforementioned placebo effects. The ring variables by themselves
Chapter 2: Blackjack or Bust 48
(that is to say, without interaction with the post-hoc indicator) test significant only
in the absence of controls for neighborhood-level fixed effects, suggesting that certain
neighborhoods near the casino tend to lower property values in the pre and post
period regardless of inclusion in the rings. However, the results show robust evidence
across specifications that the random placement of the post-hoc indicator does not
test significant–meaning that there is a factor regarding being placed after the casino
opening date of 2012 which causes these variables to be significantly positive (or
negative).
Table 2.4: Hedonic Models–Combined Sample
Treatment Models Placebo Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Ring 1 -0.198*** 0.065*** -0.267*** -0.008
(0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
Ring 2 -0.235*** 0.086*** -0.305*** 0.010
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Ring 1 x Post -0.173*** -0.190*** -0.007 -0.003
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Ring 2 x Post -0.179*** -0.197*** -0.003 -0.005
(0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
Neighborhood Fixed Effects 7 X 7 X
Observations 28,120 27,735 28,120 27,735
R2 0.450 0.772 0.445 0.767
*95% **99% ***99.9%
Note: Ring 1 is between 0 and 1.5 miles, and Ring 2 is between 1.5 and 3 miles.
2.4.2 RSR and Hybrid Model Results
The results for the RSR specifications are shown below in Table 2.5; they show a strik-
ing similarity to the results shown for the hedonic models discussed previously, save
for the slightly lower magnitude of the ”Ring 1 x Post” variable, which is about 3-6%
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lower than seen in said previously reported results. This suggests that homes sold in
the single transaction sample within the first ring could serve to amplify the negative
effects of casino placement. This observation is also supported by the comparison of
the RSR Model to the Hybrid Model: with the addition of single transaction sales
information, the effect of the ”Ring 1 x Post” variable trends closer to the magni-
tudes seen in the standard hedonic models. No neighborhood-level fixed effects are
included in either model, as the use of repeat sales renders their use unnecessary.The
similarities suggest that the RSR model specification is indeed a good substitute for
the traditional hedonic models, as discussed previously regarding the results of the
mixed models in Table 2.2. The same stability in magnitude and significance of the
experimental variables can also be seen in the results from the hybrid model, reported
in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: RSR and Hybrid Models
RSR Model Hybrid Model
Ring 1 – -0.201***
(0.013)
Ring 2 – -0.233***
(0.007)
Ring 1 x Post -0.141*** -0.167***
(0.023) (0.017)
Ring 2 x Post -0.180*** -0.186***
(0.013) (0.009)




Note: Ring 1 is between 0 and 1.5 miles, and Ring 2 is between 1.5 and 3 miles.
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2.5 Implications for Local Public Finance
As stated before, legalization of casino gambling is often justified by citing the im-
mense tax benefits granted to state and local governments from gambling activities.
In Ohio, said benefits flow directly from a 33% tax on casino operator’s gross rev-
enue from each location. 51% of these funds are distributed to county governments
statewide, with disbursements based on population. 34% of the funds are distributed
to local school districts based on student enrollment. 5% of the funds are distributed
to the cities in which each casino is located; and finally the remainder is split between
a variety of enforcement, administrative, and gambling addiction resources (OH Re-
vised Code Title 57:5753.01-5753.10, 2010).
There are a handful of papers in the literature which deal directly with the issue
of casino gambling taxation. Most of the discussion present therein deals with the
incidence and efficiency of said taxes as a means of revenue. Madhusudhan (1996)
and Anderson (2005) discuss at length the regressive nature of the use of casinos as a
source of revenue; however in Ohio the incidence of the tax is bourne directly by the
business rather than the consumer in the form of a percentage of revenue. The only
exception to this rule would be in the case where you have winnings, in which event the
casino would withhold 4% of said winnings for the state. In Columbus, there is also
an additional levy of 2.5% on winnings, for a total of 6.5%. Madhusudhan (1996) also
discusses the various factors by which casino gaming is a relatively inefficient means
of generating revenue due to the cost of enforcement relative to other sources.
Alongside these discussions, this paper seeks to offer a rough estimate of another
source of tax inefficiency in the form of property tax losses from the placement of
the casino. While there are probable losses in the forms described by the earlier
authors, and as the results will show from loss of property taxes as well, there are
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also theorized potential gains other than those realized through the casino revenue
tax. Mason and Stranahan (1996) argues that dollars spent on gambling and dollars
spent on shopping are substitutes, so that if the amount of tax you’re charging per
dollar on casino spending is higher than that being charged for consumer purchases
in the form of a sales tax, you’re generating more revenue. Meanwhile, people from
other areas would also bring in both gambling and sales tax dollars which would
not otherwise be seen without the casino amenity. For the purposes of this paper’s
analysis, I will be focusing on revenue specific to Franklin County, OH inclusive of
its various school districts and cities. This allows for easier exclusion of sales tax and
out-of-town visitor considerations given Franklin County’s location far from a state
border and relatively close to other casinos. Franklin County indeed charges a sales
tax, however I will be treating the potential gains/losses from sales taxation as null
to this analysis. Firstly, the additional revenues from consumers already within the
sales tax base for Franklin County are already baked into casino revenues. Secondly,
given the spatial distribution of casinos in Ohio, it is altogether likely that so-called
”destination shoppers” from the wider consumer base the Hollywood Casino pulls
from are already commuting to Columbus and Franklin County to make purchases
anyway. Therefore, this group can be discounted in much the same way as the former
group of local consumers.
Table 2.6 lists the amount of casino revenue tax disbursed per line item per year
to Franklin County and its associated school districts and cities. The revenues are
generally increasing, with an overall change of about +$4 million from 2013 (the first
full year of disbursement to Franklin County) to 2018. The average revenue over the
course of this period of time was about $27.7 million.
Taking this into account alongside the estimated coefficients from the various mod-
els, I construct Table 2.7, which shows the difference between the yearly property tax
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Table 2.6: Local Disbursements by Line Item and Year
Y ear Revenue Source Dollar Amount (in Thousands)
2013 County Disbursement $ 6,747.00
Columbus City Disbursement $ 6,747.00
School Disbursement (County Total) $ 8,548.00
Host City Disbursement $ 3,506.00
TOTAL $ 25,549.00
2014 County Disbursement $ 7,254.00
Columbus City Disbursement $ 7,254.00
School Disbursement (County Total) $ 9,627.00
Host City Disbursement $ 3,472.00
TOTAL $ 27,607.00
2015 County Disbursement $ 7,112.00
Columbus City Disbursement $ 7,112.00
School Disbursement (County Total) $ 9,646.00
Host City Disbursement $ 3,399.00
TOTAL $ 27,268.00
2016 County Disbursement $ 7,373.00
Columbus City Disbursement $ 7,373.00
School Disbursement (County Total) $ 10,128.00
Host City Disbursement $ 3,546.00
TOTAL $ 28,420.00
2017 County Disbursement $ 7,355.00
Columbus City Disbursement $ 7,355.00
School Disbursement (County Total) $ 9,795.00
Host City Disbursement $ 3,611.00
TOTAL $ 28,114.00
2018 County Disbursement $ 7,684.00
Columbus City Disbursement $ 7,684.00
School Disbursement (County Total) $ 10,201.00
Host City Disbursement $ 3,691.00
TOTAL $ 29,259.00
Source: Ohio Department of Taxation
revenue foregone by Franklin County versus the average local tax revenue generated
by casino gambling. The estimates for foregone property tax revenue were calculated
by first multiplying the coefficients by the ”Rings x post-2012” variable, and then
taking that as the percentage difference between the value before and after. This
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number could then be used with the assessed value of every property within 6 miles
of the casino as of 2011 (right before casino placement) to get a reasonable estimate
of the dollar amount by which property values declined. Finally, this number was
multiplied by the effective tax rate–a number given in the raw data set–as well as
the adjustment factor for property value (30% for each home). The sum of this value
across all homes within 6 miles of the casino with respect to the coefficients from each
model yields the results reported in Table 2.7.
















– $ 27,702.83 –
Pooled Hedonic
Model
No $ 44,969.00 $ 17,266.17
Yes $ 49,878.00 $ 22,175.17
Single Transaction
Hedonic Model
No $ 39,950.00 $ 12,247.17
Yes $ 50,168.00 $ 22,465.17
Repeat Sales Model – $ 47,103.00 $ 19,400.17
Hybrid Model – $ 44,811.00 $ 17,108.17
Average Foregone
Additional Revenue
– – $ 18,443.67
Sources: Ohio Department of Taxation and Franklin County, OH Auditor’s Office
Note: dollar figures in millions
These results indicate that the average yearly property tax losses associated with
casino placement exceed the average yearly amount generated by on average $13.8
million. There are reasons to believe this number may be either inflated or under-
stated. With regards to the former, there might very well be factors which were
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impossible to effectively control for, such as increased commercial activity in the
given area, which increased local sales tax revenues due to more local versus out-
of-area buying. However, the businesses that opened up near the casino are mostly
recreational facilities and restaurants–not places of business which directly compete
with online and out-of-area merchants. A case could be made in these instances that
there is a not-insignificant increase in income as discussed in previous sections; this
effect is difficult to measure given available data. With regards to the latter–the
notion that the estimates of losses could be understated–I also look to the sales tax
mechanism. While there is revenue gained due to the higher tax on casino revenues
versus consumer sales, the local community is still losing local sales tax dollars due
to the substitution of gambling for consumer purchases, and thus these losses would
amplify the amount of foregone additional revenue reported in Table 2.7.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper seeks to both estimate the effect on residential property values from the
placement of a casino in the local area as well as to extend these results into real
dollar amounts of property tax foregone by the placement of the casino, which is a
novel extension of related literature on casino gaming and taxation. Franklin County,
Ohio is a perfect case for this analysis due primarily to easy access to transactions
data. As well, the placement of the county far away from any borders and relatively
close to competing casinos allows for the control of any additional sales tax revenue
from out-of-state gamblers.
In order to accomplish this task, a multitude of models are estimated using a
standard hedonic, RSR, and hybrid approach in the mold of Case and Quigley (1991),
respectively. The coefficients of certain model variations are then used to calculate
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the percentage change in property values around the casino, which is finally used to
estimate the difference between tax revenues gained from casino revenues and lost
due to the disamenity value of the casino.
The results, both consistent in significance and magnitude, show ample evidence
that casino placement generated a disamenity value equal to about a 6-7% decline in
value with each additional mile of proximity for homes sold within six miles of the
casino placement site following the placement year of 2012. Placebo measures of the
”Distance x Post-2012” experimental variable fail to test significant at any standard
level, providing an extra layer of robustness to my results. The difference between
the average additional tax revenue from 2013-2018 and the foregone property tax
revenue is indeed negative in the range of about $12-14 million in foregone property
tax revenue.
This paper contributes to the extant literature in that it challenges the notion
that casino gambling is an obvious revenue-positive development for cash-strapped
municipal governments. While the results are by no means perfect, they provide a
novel insight into the public finance implications of casino placement, opening up
a new line of research into an issue pertinent to numerous communities across the
country.
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Pearl Jam is one of the most popular bands from the 1990s. Rolling Stone named
them one of fourteen ‘New Immortals’ when updating their top 100 all-time great
artists list in 2013 (Rolling Stone, 2013). Founded in Seattle in 1990 (Pearl Jam,
2011), they are associated with the so-called ‘grunge’ movement that came out of
the Pacific Northwest in the early 1990s (Yarm, 2011). According to the Recording
Industry Association of America (2020), Pearl Jam has sold over 30 million albums
in their career. A 2011 readers poll in Rolling Stone named them as one of the Top
10 live acts of all-time (Rolling Stone, 2011).
Beyond their music, Pearl Jam is known for its activism, with one scholar calling
them the ‘conscience of arena rock’ (Weglarz, 2016). In the mid 1990s, the band
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took on what they saw as Ticketmaster’s excessively high service fees and effective
monopolization of concert venues in the United States (Boehlert, 1995). In 2006, the
band set up a nonprofit called the Vitalogy Foundation to support their philanthropic
efforts. With $3 per ticket from every Pearl Jam concert, the foundation supports
non-profit organizations trying to improve their communities in Seattle and around
the United States (Millman, 2018). In January of 2018, Pearl Jam announced two
concerts – dubbed the “Home Shows” – to be held in Seattle in August to raise
awareness and funds to combat homelessness in Seattle (Kreps, 2018). A 2018 US
Housing and Urban Development study found that Seattle had the third-highest
homeless population of any US city (Henry et al., 2018).
Held at Safeco Field, the home of the Seattle Mariners, the two concerts held
on August 8th and August 10th were estimated to be the largest headlining concert
event in Seattle since the Rolling Stones’ two-night show at the Kingdome in 1981
(Shafer, 2018). The stadium seats approximately 45,000 for concerts. With shows
only a day apart, the sold-out concerts could have brought between tens of thousands
of fans to Seattle, depending on how many fans purchased tickets to both shows. The
fund raising goal of the concerts was $10 million, with Pearl Jam providing matches
up to $960,000 for donations made by fans when purchasing tickets (Land, 2018).
Ultimately, over $11.5 million was raised for homelessness through the Home Shows
(Krouoderova, 2018).
The festival-like nature of the Home Shows meant that Seattle may have benefited
beyond the $11.5 million in donations. The timing of the concert in early August,
combined with a planned off-day between the two concerts, made it ideal destination
for Pearl Jam fans looking to travel see Pearl Jam during the 2018 tour. In addition,
since 1995 Pearl Jam had offered tickets to its fan club members prior to making
tickets available to the general public (Boehlert, 1995). This allowed out-of-state and
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out-of-country Pearl Jam fans to buy tickets for both shows and plan an extended
trip to Seattle. This maximizes the impact on hotel demand, since it minimized the
leakages from residents, “time switchers,” and “casuals” (Crompton, Lee, & Shuster,
2001).1
In this paper we estimate a large portion of the economic impact associated with
Pearl Jam’s Home Shows by examining daily hotel data on the Seattle metropolitan
area. While concert visitors spend dollars on food and shopping, the largest portion
of their spending that is not displacing spending by locals is on hotel nights (Heller,
Matheson, & Stephenson, 2018). The economic impact of cultural events such as
concerts crucially depends on the ability to draw visitors from outside the area (Hodur,
Bangsund, Leistritz, & Kaatz, 2006). That is because spending by local residents
on the event is likely just substituting for other forms of entertainment (Baade &
Matheson, 2001).
We estimate the economic impact of Pearl Jam’s Home Shows for two reasons.
First, the impact of the Home Shows on the city of Seattle extend beyond raising
awareness and charitable donations for homelessness. To preview our results, we find
that the Pearl Jam Home Shows were associated with an increase in hotel demand
that increased both the average room rate and occupancy. As a result, we estimate
that the Home Shows increased lodging tax revenues in King County (Seattle’s home
county) to the tune of $9 million. Second, the unique nature of these back-to-back
concerts, combined with Pearl Jam’s devoted fan base and unique ticket distribution
method, provide a ‘best case’ scenario for how musical events can contribute to local
economies. We find that Pearl Jam’s Home Shows increase daily hotel revenue on
1“Time switchers” are people who had already planned to attend Seattle in 2018 but changed
their trip to coincide with the concert. Casuals are individuals who were already visiting Seattle
and found out about the concerts and decided to go. Given the sell-out of the concert in advance,
casuals are effectively zero in this case.
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concert days by $8.9 million. Our work thus contributes to the literature on the
economic impact of concerts and cultural events (Bracalente et al., 2011; T. Gabe,
2016; T. M. Gabe & Lisac, 2014; Gazel & Schwer, 1997; Senior & Danson, 1998).
We proceed as follows. Section 3.1 discusses our daily hotel data and empirical
approach. Section 3.2 presents our baseline results, while Section 3.3 presents placebo
results. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.1 Data and Methods
The data used within this paper are nightly hotel demand data provided by STR,
a firm that tracks global hotel supply and demand. In using hotel demand data to
estimate the economic impact of events, we are following recent papers such as Heller
et al. (2018), Depken and Stephenson (2018), Earhart and Stephenson (2018), and
Bonneau and Hall (2020). These papers use daily hotel demand data from STR to
estimate the effect of the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, sporting
events in Charlotte, same-sex weddings in Savannah and Charleston, and football
and basketball games in Morgantown, WV. Collins, Depken, and Stephenson (2020)
and Sheehan and Stephenson (2020) focus on a number of events, including multi-day
music festivals and find substantial effects of festivals on hotel demand and revenue.
The period in question for the data is from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2018,
and the data is aggregated to the metropolitan area.
Given the geographic concentration of Seattle, this is a lesser issue than for other
cities which may be more widespread geographically. Data is then also taken for
home games played by three major sports teams in the area–the Seahawks of the Na-
tional Football League (NFL), the Sounders of Major League Soccer(MLS), and the
Mariners of Major League Baseball (MLB) –from the websites of either the league
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Full Sample (N = 5479)
ADR 124.52 26.63 67.82 234.11
Occupancy 70.74 15.22 25.41 98.50
RevPar 90.83 35.56 19.71 228.41
Supply 40,207 2,908 35,254 48,667
Demand 28,534 6,861 9,390 46,007
Revenue (in thousands) 3,702.66 1,635.46 727.43 10,770.98
August (N = 465)
ADR 143.61 32.46 93.83 234.11
Occupancy 86.46 8.36 54.51 98.48
RevPar 125.24 34.79 55.90 228.41
Supply 40,4180 3,027 36,012 47,155
Demand 34,985 4,573 21,426 46,007
Revenue (in thousands) 5,141.37 1,767.22 2,051.95 10,770.98
Week of Concert (N = 7)
ADR 211.61 19.33 178.76 234.11
Occupancy 90.52 8.32 73.31 97.56
RevPar 192.86 33.11 131.05 228.41
Supply* 47,155 0.000 47,155 47,155
Demand 42,688 3,924 34,571 46,007
Revenue (in thousands) 9,094.38 1,561.61 6,180.08 10,770.98
*Supply constant over course of concert week.
or the individual teams, and then converted to indicator variables for the days on
which games fell. The variables of interest are occupancy, revenue per available room
(RevPar), average daily room rates (ADR), demand, supply, and total revenue (in
thousands of dollars). Occupancy is the proportion of available rooms occupied on
any given day, ADR is the total revenue divided by the number of rooms sold (de-
mand), and revenue per room is the total revenue divided by the number of available
rooms. Summary statistics for this set of covariates is found in Table 3.1. This in-
cludes summary statsitics for three different subsets: the total sample, sample days
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in August, and the week of the concert.
The summary statistics show that on average, 71% of rooms are full on any given
night in Seattle during the sample period, compared with 86% in August and 91%
during the week of the shows. Revenue shows a massive jump during the week of
the concert compared with other times represented, which is in line with the high
occupancy numbers of the week. Other variables follow the same pattern, given that
most of them are derived from occupancy and revenues. Indeed, it is particularly
jarring that the maximum values of the demand indicators during the week of the
concert are also largely the maximum values across the entire sample.
Figure 3.1: Average ADR by Weekday, 2004-2018 vs. Week of Home Shows
A breakdown of Average ADR by day of the week and year is given in Figure 3.1
for the full sample and Figure 3.1 for days just in August. In each graph, the ADR
for the week of the concert is given, and in each case appears significantly higher than
the yearly averages by day of week in the full sample, and relatively higher than daily
averages in the August sample. This is especially pertinent to the 2018 number, given
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that this is the year the home shows took place. It is also in line with the summary
statistics described in Table 3.1.
Figure 3.2: Average ADR by Weekday, Aug. 2004-2018 vs. Week of Home Shows
3.2 Empirical Results
Our analysis is conducted on five variables listed in Table 3.1: average daily room
rates (ADR), revenue per available room (RevPar), demand, occupancy, and revenue
(in thousands). Each specification controls for the days on which recurring major
home sports games played by three major local teams–the Sounders, the Seahawks,
and the Mariners–could distort hotel demand. This is accomplished with a matrix
of dummy variables for each day a home game is played on. Model fixed effects are
included for the day of week to control for recurrently high-demand days, the week in
the total sample to control for other, non-recurrent events, the month of the year to
control for seasonal demand, and the year in the sample to control for yearly trends
in supply, demand, overall price increases, etc.
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These fixed effects help account for the upward trend seen in the Figures 1 and
2, which show clear gains. It would also help to show if there’s clear evidence of a
difference between the week of sample observation in the figures and the 2018 numbers,
both for August and for the whole sample, as ”August” and ”2018” are controlled for
in the model. Finally, dummies are constructed for plus/minus five days before the
first and after the second concert, to control for the build-up in travelers arriving for
the destination event. Alongside these are controls for the days of the shows–August
8th and 10th, 2018–as well as the day falling in between the shows. The coefficients
of these variables can be thought of as the average percentage Significance in all said
indicator variables for the days of the concert time frame showing a build-up in the
prior days, followed by a relative peak during the shows and a decline during the
days following the shows, would provide evidence that the shows led to a significant
increase in hotel demand during the Home shows and thus that such events bring in
a large volume of outside travel and hotel spending from concert tourists.
We find statistically significant effects on hotel demand on the concert days, the
day in between the concerts, and in the days both leading up to and following the
concert; results reported in Table 3.2. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
the Pearl Jam Home Shows were a destination event–people filled up hotel rooms
for several days before and after the concert in the absence of another major event.
Indeed, occupancy spiked at around 96% the day of the concert, and was in the 88%
to 90% range for the day before the first show and the three days preceding the show.
This also makes sense when one considers the days of the week the shows fell on–
Wednesday August 8 and Friday August 10, 2018. People would be more likely to
stay after the last show, given that it’s a weekend, versus during the days preceding
the first show, given that they’re workdays. The trend in occupancy is also observed
in ADR, with revenue rates per room rising to over $200 a night on the concert days,
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Table 3.2: Econometric Models
ADR Occupancy RevPar Demand Revenue
(Intercept) 65.771∗∗∗ 29.187∗∗∗ 17.179∗∗∗ 10611.212∗∗∗ 610.724∗∗
(3.514) (3.212) (6.114) (1291.798) (259.199)
Seahawks 4.598∗∗∗ 5.846∗∗∗ 10.440∗∗∗ 2362.205∗∗∗ 430.090∗∗∗
(0.553) (0.505) (0.961) (203.158) (40.764)
Mariners 1.484∗∗∗ 1.957∗∗∗ 3.538∗∗∗ 765.591∗∗∗ 140.648∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.265) (0.505) (106.617) (21.393)
Sounders 0.028 1.265∗∗∗ 0.741 456.762∗∗ 15.654
(0.507) (0.464) (0.883) (186.555) (37.432)
PlusSix −7.181 −6.807 −19.932 −3359.625 −925.225∗
(7.457) (6.816) (12.974) (2741.360) (550.054)
PlusFive −5.307 −9.065 −19.652 −4156.640 −853.454
(7.458) (6.817) (12.976) (2741.817) (550.145)
PlusFour −9.065 −10.654 −27.048∗∗ −4995.751∗ −1212.281∗∗
(7.458) (6.817) (12.975) (2741.706) (550.123)
PlusThree −11.910 −5.501 −23.678∗ −2985.059 −1120.034∗∗
(7.457) (6.817) (12.975) (2741.559) (550.093)
PlusTwo −16.346∗∗ −5.555 −34.376∗∗∗ −3725.124 −1749.721∗∗∗
(7.460) (6.819) (12.980) (2742.690) (550.320)
PlusOne 120.539∗∗∗ 60.804∗∗∗ 148.367∗∗∗ 31149.643∗∗∗ 7106.260∗∗∗
(8.112) (7.415) (14.114) (2982.384) (598.415)
ConcertDays 144.789∗∗∗ 67.692∗∗∗ 187.486∗∗∗ 34503.705∗∗∗ 8996.060∗∗∗
(6.892) (6.300) (11.991) (2533.648) (508.376)
InBetw 138.829∗∗∗ 61.391∗∗∗ 174.288∗∗∗ 31854.211∗∗∗ 8435.039∗∗∗
(8.131) (7.433) (14.147) (2989.337) (599.810)
MinusOne 135.293∗∗∗ 65.811∗∗∗ 177.170∗∗∗ 33721.194∗∗∗ 8557.183∗∗∗
(8.136) (7.437) (14.156) (2991.257) (600.195)
MinusTwo 126.998∗∗∗ 65.470∗∗∗ 162.885∗∗∗ 33141.561∗∗∗ 7816.936∗∗∗
(8.143) (7.443) (14.167) (2993.590) (600.663)
MinusThree 121.156∗∗∗ 69.895∗∗∗ 156.877∗∗∗ 34530.739∗∗∗ 7415.253∗∗∗
(8.152) (7.451) (14.183) (2996.898) (601.327)
MinusFour 17.991∗∗∗ 6.483 29.915∗∗ 3498.821 1442.354∗∗∗
(6.896) (6.304) (11.999) (2535.320) (508.712)
MinusFive 14.294∗∗ 5.658 23.216∗ 3020.978 1113.962∗∗
(6.896) (6.303) (11.998) (2535.156) (508.679)
MinusSix 12.320∗ 2.430 18.204 1620.335 934.363∗
(6.897) (6.304) (12.000) (2535.600) (508.768)
R2 0.956 0.887 0.925 0.910 0.936
Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! !
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. N=5,479 for all models. The dependent variable is noted across the
top of each specification. Day of the week, week, month, and year fixed effects included.
remaining in at least the high $100s a night from the day before the show until about
five days after the show. A possible confounding factor is a clustering of pre-season
football and regular season baseball games around the time of the home shows. The
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effect of this is controlled for in the model.
The summation of the significant days-of-concert variables in Table 3.2 (“Revenue”
regression) yields a figure of about $58.7 million, which can be interpreted as the
additional revenue brought in over those days on top of the constant average over the
whole sample, represented by the intercept. The City of Seattle has a lodging tax
of 15.6 percent for hotels with more than 60 beds (Washington State Department of
Revenue, 2018).2 If every additional dollar of hotel revenue occured in Seattle this
amounts to an increase in hotel tax revenue of $9.15 million. The hotel tax varies
throughout King County, however, with Seattle being the maximum and the lowest
being 11.4% (Washington State Department of Revenue, 2018). If every hotel night
was outside Seattle proper but in King County and in a hotel with 60 or more beds,
the additional hotel tax revenue from the Home Shows is at least $6.69 million.3
3.3 Robustness Check
In addition to the regression results reported in Table 3.2, results are also reported for
a set of placebo regressions in Table 3.3. The function of the placebo regressions in
this particular incidence is to see whether or not assuming that the Home Shows took
place on the same days in a random year produce results similar to the regressions
for the Home Shows. The placebo dates in this case are August 8 and 10, 2015.
The means (intercepts) are essentially the same for every variable of interest across
2Seattle also has a tourism improvement area downtown. The seventy hotels in downtown Seattle
with more than 60 beds levy an additional $2 per occupied room, per night. We ignore this $2 tax
in our analysis, but it could be as high a few hundred thousands, depending on how many Pearl
Jam funds crowded non-Pearl Jam hotel customers to outlying areas.
3While our hotel data includes hotels in the entire Seattle Metropolitan area, cities in Snohomish
and Pierce counties have hotel taxes consistent with the areas of King County that are not Seattle
proper (Washington State Department of Revenue, 2018). For this reason we feel confident in saying
that the Home Shows brought at least $6.69 million in additional tax revenue to city governments
in the Seattle metropolitan area.
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Table 3.3: Placebo Models
ADR Occupancy RevPar Demand Revenue
(Intercept) 65.769∗∗∗ 29.191∗∗∗ 17.182∗∗∗ 10612.869∗∗∗ 610.836∗∗
(3.518) (3.213) (6.125) (1292.552) (259.872)
Seahawks 4.591∗∗∗ 5.861∗∗∗ 10.456∗∗∗ 2368.509∗∗∗ 430.796∗∗∗
(0.554) (0.506) (0.964) (203.434) (40.901)
Mariners 1.488∗∗∗ 1.982∗∗∗ 3.585∗∗∗ 778.301∗∗∗ 143.005∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.265) (0.505) (106.659) (21.444)
Sounders −0.025 1.276∗∗∗ 0.669 456.475∗∗ 11.351
(0.507) (0.463) (0.882) (186.227) (37.442)
PlusSixPlacebo −1.552 −0.848 −2.667 −374.881 −113.170
(1.903) (1.738) (3.314) (699.319) (140.601)
PlusFivePlacebo −1.127 −0.787 −2.240 −321.133 −93.169
(1.933) (1.766) (3.366) (710.317) (142.812)
PlusFourPlacebo −2.379 −1.013 −4.321 −426.134 −180.461
(1.950) (1.781) (3.395) (716.577) (144.070)
PlusThreePlacebo −1.362 −0.635 −3.128 −305.237 −140.307
(1.953) (1.784) (3.400) (717.571) (144.270)
PlusTwoPlacebo 0.226 −1.660 −1.751 −638.127 −63.314
(1.943) (1.774) (3.382) (713.731) (143.498)
PlusOnePlacebo −0.762 −1.466 −2.659 −596.770 −109.082
(1.923) (1.756) (3.347) (706.423) (142.029)
ConcertDays 18.804∗∗∗ 2.202 26.180∗∗∗ 1370.378 1272.994∗∗∗
(5.274) (4.817) (9.182) (1937.793) (389.601)
InBetw 12.842∗ −4.112 12.958 −1285.280 710.815
(6.832) (6.239) (11.893) (2510.001) (504.645)
MinusOnePlacebo −1.388 1.333 −0.655 476.595 −45.994
(1.951) (1.782) (3.397) (716.942) (144.144)
MinusTwoPlacebo −2.113 1.864 −0.736 654.906 −57.432
(1.989) (1.817) (3.463) (730.935) (146.957)
MinusThreePlacebo −1.338 1.794 0.723 675.033 13.795
(2.026) (1.850) (3.527) (744.347) (149.654)
MinusFourPlacebo −2.587 1.426 −1.295 487.370 −76.804
(2.059) (1.880) (3.584) (756.485) (152.094)
MinusFivePlacebo −3.135 0.885 −2.574 284.974 −123.174
(2.074) (1.894) (3.610) (761.950) (153.193)
MinusSixPlacebo −5.227∗∗ −0.638 −6.445∗ −343.279 −286.195∗
(2.095) (1.913) (3.647) (769.675) (154.746)
R2 (full sample) 0.948 0.867 0.911 0.894 0.924
Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! !
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. N=5,479 for all models. The dependent variable is noted across the
top of each specification. Day of the week, week, month, and year fixed effects included.
both tables; however, the day indicator variables for the time of the concert placebo
largely fail to test significant across all specifications. There is some evidence of
higher ADR to the level of $84 during the concert days, perhaps picking up some of
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the effect of a Mariners game played on the 10th, or another event not captured in
this model. Still, the lack of any evidence in favor of higher demand on days leading
up to, in between, and following the concert provide evidence that the results of Table
3.2 were unique to those particular occurrences of August 8th and 10th in 2018, when
the Home Shows took place.
3.4 Conclusion
Cities frequently tout mega events such as the Super Bowl as vehicles for economic
growth (Coates & Depken, 2011; Coates & Humphreys, 2002). While the literature
is clear that the benefits from mega events are not enough to justify public subsidies
(Coates & Humphreys, 2008; B. Humphreys et al., 2019), that does not mean that
mega events do not sometimes have positive economic impacts. Rather, the argument
is that the consumption and income benefits of the mega event do not justify the
investment of public dollars.
In this paper we estimate the impact of Pearl Jam’s “Home Shows” on hotel de-
mand. We find, unlike other hotel demand papers related to sports, significant leads,
indicating many fans came for multiple days. Over the range of statistically signifi-
cant days in early August 2018, we find that the Pearl Jam Home Shows increased
average daily room rates by as much as $144 a night and hotel occupancy to over
90%. The increase in hotel revenue attributed to the Home Shows is over $58 million.
Depending upon assumptions about the localities fans were located in, we estimated
that the additional hotel tax revenue brought in to Seattle metro-area municipalities
is between $6.69 million and $9.15 million.
Given the unique nature of Pearl Jam the band (each concert is unique), their
ticket distribution system, the limited touring schedule around in 2017 and 2018,
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etc., we argue that this case presents an upper bound of what a mega event can
have on hotel demand. Even if food, beverage, and entertainment purchases by Pearl
Jam fans while in Seattle entirely crowded out purchases by residents, the economic
impact of the Home Shows on the Seattle economy was substantial.
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Figure 3.8: Model 6 Kaplan-Meyer Survival Curve, CBS
